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RECENT DECISIONS 
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-DETERMINATION OF MARITAL DEDUCTION IN 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATE WHEN SURVIVING SPOUSE ELECTS To TAKE 
UNDER DECEDENT'S WILL-Decedent, a Texas resident, provided that if his 
wife elected to take under his will she would receive one-third of the total 
community property and one-third of his separate estate. The remaining 
two-thirds of decedent's total estate was devised in trust for the benefit of his 
children. The widow elected to take under the will, thereby allowing her 
interest in the community property to pass as provided in the will. The 
executors claimed a marital deduction for the one-third separate property 
passing to the widow. Since she received less under the will than the value 
of her relinquished community property,! the government disallowed the 
deduction. After paying the deficiency, the executors brought suit for a 
refund. The district court held that the bequest of one-third separate 
property qualified for the marital deduction.2 On appeal, held, affirmed, one 
judge dissenting.3 In determining the amount of the marital deduction, the 
value of the separate property passing to the surviving spouse is not re-
duced by the value of her relinquished community property passing under 
the will to decedent's children. United States v. Stapf, 309 F.2d 592 (5th 
Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 372 U.S. 928 (1963). 
For the purpose of the federal estate tax, a decedent's gross estate in-
cludes any interest in property he owned at death.4 Since each spouse has 
a present, existing, and equal right in community property,5 only one-half 
of the value of the community property is included in the gross estate of 
the first spouse to die. On the other hand, in common-law states the value 
of the surviving spouse's dower, curtesy, or statutory substitute is considered 
an expectancy and is included in the decedent's gross estate.6 The 1948 
enactment of the marital deduction7 was part of an over-all plan8 to create 
1 The net value of the widow's community property was $111,442.68. The benefits she 
received under the will amounted to $106,268.18. Principal case at 594. 
2 189 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Tex. 1960). 
s The principal case also held, one judge dissenting, that a deduction for the full 
amount of the community debts was valid since decedent provided all such debts were 
to be paid from his share of the community property. Since almost all of the debts were 
taxes imposed by law and not based on a promise or an agreement, the claim did not have 
to be for adequate consideration. 
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2033. 
IS Sec 1 DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTI' § 95 (1943). Prior to 1927, the wife's interest 
in California community property was a mere expectancy and was included in the 
husband's gross estate. C.U.. CIVIL CODE § 16l(a); see, e.g., Horst v. Commissioner, 150 
F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 761 (1945). 
6 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2034; see Westfall, Estate Planning and the Widow's Elec-
tion, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1269, 1286-87 (1958). 
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(e), added by ch. 168, 62 Stat. 117 (1948), as amended, 
ch. 512, 67 Stat. 624 (1953) (now INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056). For the legislative inter-
pretation of the marital deduction, see S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-29 
(1948). 
8 The amendments provided for a marital deduction for gifts. Int. Rev. Code of 
[123] 
124 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
geographic tax equality9 between the common-law and community prop-
erty states.10 In general, the marital deduction is allowed for property 
passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse in absolute ownership or 
its equivalent.11 In common-law states the deduction is limited to fifty 
percent of the adjusted gross estate.12 However, in community property 
states only fifty percent of a decedent's separate property can qualify.13 A 
special problem in determining the amount of the marital deduction arises 
in a community property state when the decedent's will puts the surviving 
spouse to an election. 
The doctrine of election14 presents the surviving spouse with two alter-
natives. She can accept the benefits under the will, thus assenting to the 
decedent's disposition of her community property interest. Or, she can elect 
to take her one-half of the community property, thereby denying the dece-
dent a right of disposition over her interest and rejecting the provisions 
made for her in the will. If the surviving spouse elects to take under the 
will, there are several tax consequences. Despite decedent's power of dis-
position over the total community property, only one-half is included in 
his gross estate.15 However, the surviving spouse must pay a gift tax to the 
extent the property she relinquished exceeds the value of the benefits she 
1939, § 1004(a)(3)(A), added by ch. 168, 62 Stat. 125 (1948) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 2523). They also allowed married couples in common-law states to file a joint return. 
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 5l(b), added by ch. 168, 68 Stat. 115 (1948) (now INT. REV. CODE 
OF 1954, § 6013). 
9 H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1948). See 2 BEVERIDGE, FEDERAL EsTATE 
TAXATION § 14.01 (1956); 4 MERTINS, GIFT AND EsrATE TAXATION 138 (1959). However, 
complete equality has not been attained. See Anderson, The Marital Deduction and 
Equalization Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Between Common Law and Com, 
munity Property States, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1087, 1088-99 (1956); De Wind, The Approach-
ing Crisis in Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 79, 86-91 (1950); Surrey, 
Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1097 (1948). 
For a discussion of the failure of the 1942 amendments to achieve estate tax equality, see 
LOWNDES & KRAMER, EsrATE AND GIFT TAXES 371-72 (1956). 
10 There are eight traditional community property states: Arizona, California, Idaho, 
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington. 
11 Dispositions that are equivalent to absolute ownership are enumerated in INT. 
REv. CODE oF 1954, § 2056(b). For explanation of the "terminable interest rule," see 
Reilly v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1957); S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 
2d Sess. 7-18 (1948); 2 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 14.02 & 14.03; Polasky, Estate 
Tax Marital Deduction in Estate Planning, 3 Tax Counselors Q., June 1959, pp. 17-31; 
Note, 107 u. PA. L. REV. 1176 (1959). 
12 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c)(l). The adjusted gross estate is determined by 
subtracting from the gross estate the expenses, debts, taxes and losses allowed by INT. 
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2053, 2054. 
13 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c)(2)(B). In determining the amount of separate 
property that can qualify for the deduction, a proportionate share of the expenses, debts, 
taxes, and losses must be subtracted. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c)(2)(B)(iv); see 
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(c)(4) (1958). 
u See 1 DE FuNIAK, op. cit. supra note 5, § 217. For a discussion of the tax aspects of 
election in the common-law states, see '\Vestfall, supra note 6, at 1284-89. 
15 Coffman-Dobson Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 890 (1930); accord, 
Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 128 (1939). 
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receives.10 The marital deduction problem arises when decedent's separate 
property is part of the benefits passing to the surviving spouse. The statute 
provides that if the property devised to the surviving spouse is encumbered 
or the decedent imposes any obligation on the surviving spouse with respect 
to the passing of the property, the encumbrance or obligation reduces the 
value of the bequest.17 The reduction is computed in the same manner as 
if the value of a gift of the property were being determined.18 For example, 
if real estate valued at 10,000 dollars with a 1,OOO-dollar mortgage is devised 
to the widow, the value of the property in determining the marital deduc-
tion would be 9,000 dollars.19 
The Treasury regulations provide that, when the surviving spouse elects 
to take under the will in a community property state, the value of dece-
dent's separate property interest passing to her is reduced by the value of 
the relinquished community property.20 The principal case rejects this 
regulation21 on the following grounds. The value of the bequest is deter-
mined as if it were a gift. To reduce the value of a gift there must be a 
benefit to the donor, not merely a detriment to the donee.22 The relin-
quished community property benefits legatees, not the testator. Therefore, 
the widow's relinquished community property is not deducted from dece-
dent's separate property in determining the marital deduction. 
There are three major objections to this analysis. First, the Senate report 
on the 1948 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 makes it 
clear that if property is devised to the widow on the condition that she 
give 1,000 dollars to X, the value of the property for the marital deduction 
is reduced by 1,000 dollars.23 Here the decedent receives no benefit from the 
widow. He merely effectuates an intended economic allocation of his prop-
erty. Thus the Senate report did not contemplate the requirement of a 
benefit to the decedent that is imposed in the principal case. Second, assum-
ing that there must be a benefit to the decedent, in the election situation 
16 Commissioner v. Siegel, 250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1957) (gift is amount of community 
property relinquished less widow's life estate in whole community property); accord, 
Turman v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1123 (1961); see Thurman, Federal Estate and Gift 
Taxation of Community Property, I ARIZ. L. REv. 253, 264-70 (1959). 
17 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(4)(B). 
1s Ibid. 
10 See S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1948). 
:!O Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(b)(3) (1949). 
:!l Principal case at 597. However, since the same regulation was in effect under the 
Int. Rev. Code of 1939 (Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47c(b)(2)(iii) (1949)), the court should have 
assumed that "Congress was familiar with the construction put upon the section by the 
Treasury and was satisfied with it." Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 351, 357 (1938) 
(dictum). 
:.:2 Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945). "To allow detriment to the donee to 
satisfy the requirement of 'adequate and full consideration' would violate the purpose 
of the statute and open wide the door for evasion of the gift tax." Id. at 307-08. However, 
if the strict requirement of a benefit to. the donor is adhered to in the election situation, 
the door is opened for evasion of the estate tax statute. See text accompanying note 26 
infra. 
23 S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1948). 
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the surviving spouse confers upon the decedent the only property benefit 
possible: the power of testamentary disposition over her property.24 Finally, 
geographic tax inequalities would result from the analysis in the principal 
case. The intended consequence of the marital deduction was that qualify-
ing property would be subject to taxation in the estate of the surviving 
spouse.25 In common-law states this objective is achieved. For example, 
assume that H, having an estate of 600,000 dollars, dies leaving W 300,000 
dollars. After the marital deduction H's estate would be 300,000 dollars 
and W's estate would be 300,000 dollars, or a total of 600,000 dollars in 
both estates. In community property states the effect is otherwise. If the 
principal case is followed,26 the relinquished community property escapes 
both gift and estate taxation because it is not deducted from the dece-
dent's separate property passing to the surviving spouse. For example, 
assume H and W have community property worth 200,000 dollars and 
H has a separate estate of 400,000 dollars. H dies leaving W 200,000 
dollars of his separate estate provided W allows her community property 
to pass under his will. Absent the election, H's gross estate would be 
500,000 dollars (100,000 dollars community and 400,000 dollars separate), 
and W's estate would be 100,000 dollars (one-half of the community), or a 
total of 600,000 dollars in both estates. After the election H's estate is only 
300,000 dollars (500,000 dollars less 200,000 dollars marital deduction) and 
W's estate is 200,000 dollars (benefits received under the will) or only 
500,000 dollars in both estates. Thus 100,000 dollars which would be sub-
ject to taxation in common-law states escapes taxation in community prop-
erty states. 
The proper analytical approach to the problem is to recognize the 
economic reality of the election transaction. The surviving spouse makes 
the ultimate choice to take under the will and thereby allows her non-
qualifying community interest to pass as provided by the decedent. Thus 
the marital deduction should not be allowed for that which she chose to 
exchange for her non-qualifying property.27 To hold otherwise creates the 
unequal tax burdens which the Treasury regulation28 seeks to avoid. When 
interpreting statutory language, the courts should bear in mind that geo-
graphic tax equality is the purpose of the marital deduction.20 
Jon E. Denney 
24 In a common-law state, a decedent might retain testamentary control over the 
surviving spouse's property through the utilization of joint and mutual wills. A marital 
deduction would be allowed on the theory that, during the lifetime of the surviving 
spouse, the latter would have the power to consume or dispose of the property. Awtry v. 
Commissioner, 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955). However, the widow's estate would be in-
creased by the amount of the marital deduction, which is not the case in the community 
property election situation. See text accompanying note 26 infra. 
25 Estate of Pipe, 23 T.C. 99, 104 (1954) (dictum), afj'd, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 357 U.S. 814 (1957); see 2 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 182-83. 
26 Principal case at 598. 
27 Cf. principal case at 608 (dissenting opinion). 
28 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(b)(3) (1949). 
29 See authorities cited note 9 supra. 
